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There is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single-issue lives.1
IntroductIon
Alicia Beltran encountered the harsh realities of a legislature that treats 
women as environments for pregnancy, rather than as persons with constitutional 
rights. Fourteen weeks into her pregnancy, Alicia attended a routine prenatal 
visit and disclosed a previous medical condition (painkiller addiction) and her 
successful efforts to end that addiction.2 Alicia subsequently declined her doctor’s 
recommendation to use Suboxone, an anti-addiction drug, because she was unable 
to afford the prescription on her salary as a waitress.3 Alicia soon learned that a 
Wisconsin statute4 empowers medical professionals to police their patients, rather 
than offer recommendations of care. As a result, the doctor Alicia trusted with her 
medical information became empowered by the State to utilize his personal beliefs 
to determine that she lacks “self-control” with drugs. 
1.     Audre Lorde, Learning from the 60s, Address at Harvard University (Feb. 1982), in Au-
dre Lorde, SISter outSIder: eSSAyS And SpeecheS 138 (1984).
2.     Erik Eckholm, Case Explores Rights of Fetus Versus Mother, n.y. tImeS (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/us/case-explores-rights-of-fetus-versus-mother.html. 
3.     Id.
4.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
* Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. expected 2015; State University of New York 
at Stony Brook University B.A., MBA 2011. I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor 
Dawn Johnsen for her support and guidance throughout this process. I am also immensely 
grateful to the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality associates and editorial team for 
their careful review and editing of my work. Last, but never least, I am thankful to my Mother 
for her unwavering inspiration and support.
Despite never testing positive for substance use, Alicia was arrested and 
forced to appear in shackles before a family court commissioner.5 Although she 
was not afforded representation at her hearing, a lawyer had already been appointed 
as guardian ad litem for her fetus.6 Seemingly ignoring Wisconsin precedent that 
a civilly committed individual must be presumed competent,7 the commissioner 
ordered the civil commitment of Alicia at an inpatient drug treatment program 
without hearing a single word of medical expert testimony.8 
The circumstances surrounding Alicia’s civil commitment pose great 
concerns. Alicia was shackled and detained absent any medical testimony—not in 
1853, as one would expect,9 but in 2013. Since the Wisconsin legislature authorized 
forcible commitment of pregnant women with alleged substance use under the 
guise of protectionist arguments in 1997, it is unclear how many women have been 
harmed due to the confidential nature of the proceedings.10 
Alicia’s case represented the first constitutional challenge to state statutes 
that explicitly allow civil commitment for pregnant women with alleged substance 
use.11 Unfortunately, Wisconsin is not the only state in which stories like Alicia’s can 
5.     Eckholm, supra note 2; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 by a Person in Custody at 9, Beltran v. Loenish, No. 2:13-cv-01101 (E.D. Wis. filed 
Sept. 30, 2013). 
6.     Jessica Mason Pieklo, Advocacy Group Seeks Immediate Release of Involuntarily De-
tained Pregnant Woman, rh reALIty check (Oct. 3, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.
org/article/2013/10/03/advocacy-group-seeks-immediate-release-of-pregnant-woman-de-
tained-involuntarily-for-drug-treatment/. 
7.     Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976), reinstating 349 F. Supp. 1078, 
1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (invalidating Wisconsin statute presuming civilly committed individu-
als incompetent). 
8.     Pieklo, supra note 6.
9.     Historians have found that from 1850 to 1900 women were committed to mental institu-
tions “for behaving in ways male society did not agree with,” including use of unacceptable 
“abusive” language, irregular mensuration, abortion, nymphomania, and “domestic troubles.” 
Katherine Pouba & Ashley Tianen, Lunacy in the 19th Century: Women’s Admission to Asy-
lums in United States of America, 1 oShkoSh SchoLAr 95 (2006).   
10.     Pieklo, supra note 6. For an example of one of the more recent cases reported, see Jes-
sica Mason Pieklo, Pregnant Wisconsin Woman Jailed Under State’s ‘Personhood’-Like Law, 
rh reALIty check (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/12/12/
pregnant-wisconsin-woman-jailed-states-personhood-like-law/. 
11.     Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, First Federal Challenge to Arrest 
of Pregnant Woman Under “Personhood”-Like Measure Filed in Wisconsin (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/Beltran-NAPW%20-%20Press%20Release%20
-%2010.2.13.pdf. Subsequently, on September 30, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge C.N. Clev-
ert, Jr. dismissed as moot Alicia Beltran’s claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, following the State’s 
withdrawal of its petition. Beltran v. Strachota, No. 2:13-cv-01101, 2014 WL 4924668 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 30, 2014). The Court declined to take a position regarding the possibility of a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Id. at *7; Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Wiscon-
sin Alicia Beltran Case Federal District Court Avoids Ruling on Constitutionality (Sept. 30, 
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occur. Four states—Minnesota,12 Oklahoma,13 South Dakota,14 and Wisconsin15—
currently authorize civil commitment for pregnant women suspected of substance 
use. Additionally, at least thirty-four states have attempted to use existing criminal 
statutes—such as crimes of child abuse, child neglect, and delivery of drugs to 
a minor—to prosecute pregnant women.16 The outcome of these cases, including 
Alicia’s, could have serious implications for the millions of women who become 
pregnant every year in the United States.17
  “Childbearing is a major life passage for over 4.3 million mothers, newborns, 
and families annually in the United States. . . . Only three reasons for outpatient visits 
involve more visits annually than maternity care (prenatal and postpartum visits 
combined): general medical examination, progress visit, and cough.”18 As a result, 
pregnancy and state intervention has naturally been a topic of debate amongst many 
legal scholars.19 Our nation’s history is plagued with limits uniquely applicable to 
2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/09/wisconsin_alicia_beltran_case.
php (“The Court suggested, however, that another civil rights action, potentially representing 
a class of women brought within the ambit of the law, might not present the same mootness 
issues.”). 
12.     mInn. StAt. Ann. § 253B.02(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015). 
13.     okLA. StAt. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-546.5 (West 2000); okLA. StAt. Ann. tit. 43A, § 5-410 
(West 2014).
14.     S.D. codIfIed LAWS § 34-20A-63 (2011).
15.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
16.     Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public Health Oriented Re-
sponse to Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 1 yALe J. heALth poL’y L. & ethIcS 217, 218 
(2001). Most recently, Tennessee passed a law that would allow prosecutors to bring crimi-
nal charges against pregnant women who struggle with drug dependency. Emily Crockett, 
Tennessee Governor Signs Bill Criminalizing Pregnant Women, rh reALIty check (Apr. 29, 
2014, 5:17 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014/04/29/tennessee-governor-signs-bill-
criminalizing-pregnant-women/. 
17.     See, e.g., SALLy c. curtIn, Joyce c. AbmA & StephAnIe J. VenturA, nAt’L ctr. for 
heALth StAtIStIcS, pregnAncy rAteS for u.S. Women contInue to drop 1 (2013), http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db136.pdf.
18.     cAroL SAkALA & mAureen p. corry, eVIdence-bASed mAternIty cAre: WhAt It IS And 
WhAt It cAn AchIeVe 2 (2008), http://www.milbank.org/uploads/documents/0809MaternityC
are/0809MaternityCare.pdf.
19.     See, e.g., April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Preg-
nant Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 coLum. J. gender & L. 147 (2007); Lynn M. 
Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 
depAuL J. heALth cAre L. 461 (2005); Schroedel & Fiber, supra note 16. For arguments that 
civil commitment of pregnant women for drug use violates equal protection and due process 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, see Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by 
Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 
n.y.u. reV. L. & Soc. chAnge 381 (2008). For constitutional arguments examining the crimi-
nalization approach towards women who use drugs while pregnant, see Barrie L. Becker, 
Order in the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-Dependent 
Defendants to Protect Fetal Health, 19 hAStIngS conSt. L.Q. 235 (1991); Molly McNulty, 
Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women 
for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 n.y.u. reV. L. & Soc. chAnge 277 (1987–88).
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women due to their reproductive capacity.20 Yet, in today’s environment where many 
limits have been found to be constitutionally impermissible,21 at least one loophole 
remains open: civil commitment for pregnant women with alleged substance use.
 There has been great scholarly inquiry into whether civil commitment of 
pregnant women on the basis of fetal protection violates constitutional rights.22 Some 
legal scholars have argued that such confinement is a clear violation of due process, 
equal protection, privacy rights, and reproductive rights.23 While in agreement with 
those scholars, this Note will focus on how sanism and additional biases diminish the 
legal standards of civil commitment when applied to pregnant women. 
 Civil commitment determinations are already infiltrated by sanism: an 
irrational prejudice against those with mental disabilities and illnesses expressed 
through stereotyping and stigmatization, similar to that of other prejudices such as 
racism and sexism.24 Yet, deficiencies in civil commitment safeguards for pregnant 
women cannot be explained simply as an issue of sanism, gender oppression, wealth 
inequality, or racism. Rather, each of these components must be combined to reveal 
how the interaction of each erodes the constitutional protections of civil commitment, 
thereby preventing the law from being applied in a way that would avoid these 
problems. States should refrain from manipulating their civil commitment laws to 
extend to pregnant women with alleged substance use. 
 Part I of this Note will discuss civil commitment through an examination 
of the history of state powers, current constitutional doctrine, and the difficulties in 
quantifying dangerousness. Part II of this Note will explore how sanism, pregnancy, 
race, and socioeconomic status interact to diminish civil commitment safeguards. This 
Note will conclude by applying the issues discussed to Alicia’s case and urging states to 
recognize that application of the civil commitment standard to pregnant women, absent 
other safeguards, will inevitably engender wrongful deprivations of liberty. 
I. cIVIL commItment
Involuntary civil commitment is the legal, medical, and psychosocial 
process—operating at the confluence of the public safety, justice, 
20.     See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 
132 (1872). 
21.     Contra Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22.     E.g., Erin N. Linder, Note, Punishing Prenatal Alcohol Abuse: The Problems Inherent 
in Utilizing Civil Commitment to Address Addiction, 2005 u. ILL. L. reV. 873 (2005) (arguing 
that civil commitment laws to prevent fetal alcohol syndrome violate due process and equal 
protection).
23.     See sources cited supra note 19.
24.     Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find Out When 
You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and 
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than “Idiot Wind?”, 35 u. mIch. J.L. reform 235, 235 
(2001–02). 
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and social service systems—whereby an individual alleged to be 
harmful to self or others as a result of some physical or mental 
impairment or disability (drug dependency, mental illness, mental 
retardation, alcoholism, or some combination), is forced to undergo 
some type of involuntary treatment or care.25
 
A. The Roots of Civil Commitment and Constitutional Developments
 Involuntary civil commitment traces back to English law in 1714, which 
permitted justices of the peace to restrain and confine the poor who posed a danger 
as “furiously Mad.”26 As early as 1891, Supreme Court jurisprudence recognized 
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law.”27 Yet, courts still grapple with the difficulty in balancing civil commitment 
rationales with individual liberty rights.
 Great debate arises from the tendency of civil commitment to run afoul of 
constitutional rights: against unreasonable search and seizure, to due process, against 
restraints on liberty, and to refuse medical treatment. When a civil commitment 
is premised solely upon dual status of pregnancy and substance use, additional 
implications arise regarding equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the right to reproductive decision making.28 Policy issues also arise regarding the 
effectiveness of treatment under involuntary detention, profit gouging by for-profit 
institutions,29 and deterrence of those seeking medical care.30 The U.S. Supreme 
Court arguably addressed these concerns in Addington v. Texas, holding that “civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection.”31
25.     Sandra Anderson Garcia, Drug Addiction and Mother/Child Welfare: Rights, Laws, and 
Discretionary Decisionmaking, 13 J. LegAL med. 129, 176 (1992).
26.     Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Prac-
tice, 2 hArV. nAt’L Sec. J. 85, 156–57 (2011).
27.     Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added).
28.     See sources cited supra note 19.
29.     Garcia, supra note 25, at 176.
30.     At least in the pregnancy context, many legal scholars and health professionals have 
argued that involuntary commitment can serve as a deterrent for pregnant women to volun-
tarily seek substance abuse care. See, e.g., comm. on heALth cAre for underSerVed Women, 
Am. coLL. of obStetrIcIAnS & gynecoLogIStS, commIttee opInIon no. 473, SubStAnce AbuSe 
reportIng And pregnAncy: the roLe of the obStetrIcIAn-gynecoLogISt (2011) [hereinafter 
Acog no. 473] (reaffirmed 2014); Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, 
and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALb. L. reV. 999, 1044 (1999).
31.     441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (emphasis added).
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 Two traditional state powers provide the basis for civil commitment: 
(1) police power, and (2) parens patriae power.32 Police power justifies civil 
commitment when it implicates a state’s right to protect itself against breaches 
of peace caused by a dangerous person.33 Parens patriae power justifies civil 
commitment when it implicates a state’s right to act on behalf of an individual with 
a mental disease or defect that prevents care for his or her own welfare.34 Although 
both powers potentially allow for restraint on an individual’s physical liberty, 
the U.S. Constitution imposes severe limits. For example, police power cannot 
be used broadly to protect a community from all possible dangers.35 Likewise, 
parens patriae power cannot be used sweepingly to protect an individual from all 
improvident acts.36
 Up until at least the 1960s, state courts did not afford a guarantee of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment in involuntary civil commitment 
proceedings.37 As a result of demands from the medical community, pressure grew 
to implement unambiguous grounds for involuntary civil commitment.38 This push 
was reflected in a shift in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine during the 1970s when the 
Court took steps to refine the basis for civil commitment. First, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Jackson v. Indiana that Due Process Clause protections should be 
afforded to those in civil commitment proceedings, despite traditional deference to 
states to exercise “broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill.”39 
 Three years later, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme Court 
formulated the minimum constitutional requirement for civil commitment:
A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking 
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple 
custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given 
a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be 
32.     Carol Gosain, Case Note, Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem 
of Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel. Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 geo. mASon L. 
reV. 799, 828 (1997).
33.     Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that the police power of 
a State includes “such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment 
as will protect the public health and the public safety”); Cherry, supra note 19, at 177; Hugh 
Alan Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 mIch. L. reV. 
945, 955 (1959).
34.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 177; John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of 
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 buff. L. reV. 499, 504 (1981); Developments in the Law–
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 hArV. L. reV. 1190, 1207–22 (1974).
35.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 177.
36.     Id.
37.     E.g., Prochaska v. Brinegar, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1960). 
38.     See, e.g., nAt’L InSt. of mentAL heALth, fed. Sec. Agency, pub. heALth SerV. pub. no. 
51, A drAft Act goVernIng hoSpItALIzAtIon of the mentALLy ILL (1951). 
39.     406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972).
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identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous 
to no one and can live safely in freedom. . . . In short, a State cannot 
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual 
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the 
help of willing and responsible family members or friends.40
 In declaring a right to liberty in O’Connor v. Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme 
Court set the groundwork for substantive constitutional limits for civil commitment.41 
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Addington v. Texas that “clear 
and convincing evidence” was the appropriate minimum standard of proof for civil 
commitment proceedings.42 Black’s Law Dictionary has historically defined the 
clear and convincing evidence standard to require proof that “will produce in the 
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to 
be established.”43 States are still free, however, to require a higher level of proof 
for civil commitments.44 For instance, in recognizing the risk for erroneous loss of 
liberty, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts exceeded Addington’s “clear 
and convincing” standard in requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.45
 Today, depending on the jurisdiction, there are two permissible categories 
for civil commitment if shown by clear and convincing evidence: (1) mental illness 
and danger to self or others; and (2) detention when one needs treatment and is 
incapable of procuring care.46 As a result, states are prohibited from committing 
a person on the sole basis of mental illness status absent a showing of danger or 
inability to care for oneself.  
 States have authorized civil commitment for drug and alcohol abuse47 
by: specific statutory reference to involuntary commitment for drug use with a 
40.     422 U.S. 563, 575, 576 (1975) (emphasis added).
41.     See id. at 573 n.8, 576.
42.     441 U.S. 418, 425–33 (1979).
43.     bLAck’S LAW dIctIonAry 227 (5th ed. 1979). See also pAuL S. AppeLbAum & thomAS g. 
gutheIL, cLInIcAL hAndbook of pSychIAtry And the LAW 50−51 (2d ed. 1991).
44.     Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. 
45.     Commonwealth v. Nassar, 406 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Mass. 1980); Superintendent of 
Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 372 N.E.2d 242, 245–46 (Mass. 1978). 
46.     Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 153. 
47.     The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta in Robinson v. California, has arguably left the door 
wide open for states to use involuntary commitment to mandate alcohol or drug treatment 
for substance-dependent individuals. See David F. Chavkin, “For Their Own Good”: Civil 
Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.d. L. reV. 224, 246 
(1992) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 n.7 (1962) (holding criminalization 
of alcohol or drug addiction status as unconstitutional, yet civil commitment and mandatory 
treatment as a constitutionally permissible alternative route)); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Ali 
John Amirshahi, Civil Commitment for Drug Dependency: The Judicial Response, 26 Loy. 
L.A. L. reV. 39, 43 (1992).
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showing of danger to self or others; inclusion of drug or alcohol addiction under 
general references to “mental illness” with a showing of dependence and risk of 
danger to self or others; or temporary emergency commitment for detoxification.48 
These categories present a mix of police and parens patriae powers. Regardless of 
whether a state elects to use police or parens patriae powers, courts encounter great 
difficulties in determining whether requisite dangerousness is present to justify 
involuntary civil commitment. 
  
B. Inherent Difficulties in Determining Dangerousness 
  
 Despite the risk of serious deprivation of liberty that can result from a 
finding of dangerousness, no precise or uniform definition of dangerousness 
exists.49 The burden of proof falls upon the state requesting civil commitment 
to demonstrate danger to self or others by a minimum of clear and convincing 
evidence.50 Dangerousness can typically be shown by harm or attempted harm, 
inability to care for oneself, or failure to remedy immediate and dangerous medical 
problems resulting from substance abuse.51 
 Although the evidentiary standard of “clear and convincing” is the 
constitutional minimum required by the U.S. Supreme Court, legislators and lower 
courts have yet to clearly define what precise level of dangerousness is required for 
civil commitment.52 While this Note argues that dangerousness should be defined 
with true legal and medical concepts, alternative approaches include viewing 
dangerousness as a socially defined condition53 or in the classic statement of Justice 
Stewart, “I know it when I see it.”54    
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to explain dangerousness fell short in its 
dicta in Humphrey v. Cady.55 There the Court defined dangerousness as the point at 
which a person’s “potential for doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough 
to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.”56 Following this dicta in Humphrey, 
a three-judge federal district court panel in Lessard v. Schmidt interpreted “great 
enough” to imply use of a balancing test, which required “an extreme likelihood 
48.     Klein & Wittes, supra note 26, at 181−83.
49.     Alexander D. Brooks, Notes on Defining the “Dangerousness” of the Mentally Ill, in 
dAngerouS behAVIor: A probLem In LAW And mentAL heALth 37, 39 (Calvin J. Frederick ed., 
1978). 
50.     Chavkin, supra note 47, at 267.
51.     Hafemeister & Amirshahi, supra note 47, at 52.
52.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 48.
53.     E.g., Donald H. J. Hermann, Preventive Detention, a Scientific View of Man, and State 
Power, 1973 u. ILL. L.f. 673, 685 (1973).
54.     Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining the 
difficulty in defining obscenity).
55.     405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
56.     Id.
240
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that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others.”57 
Several courts have since incorporated the Lessard approach to require an overt 
act signifying a real and present danger of significant harm.58 Yet, all courts do 
not follow the overt act standard.59 For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit adopted an alternative approach in which a mere finding of 
substantial risk of harm, as opposed to recent overt acts and threat of imminent 
danger, is sufficient for a civil commitment.60 
 With a lack of legislative guidance, courts have traditionally received 
broad discretion to interpret civil commitment statutes sweepingly; the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia previously found that writing a 
bad check61 or emotional injury62 satisfied the requirement of “dangerousness” 
for civil commitment. In addition to implementing its own judgment, courts have 
historically “rubber stamped” any health professional’s subjective determination 
of dangerousness despite the lack of any generally accepted meaning of the term 
among the legal, psychiatric, or medical community.63
 It is troublesome to rely on predictions of future dangerousness because 
predictions are often wrong.64 False positive rates (that is, an incorrect finding 
of future dangerousness) are far more likely than false negative rates (that is, an 
incorrect finding of no future dangerousness).65 In fact, the American Psychiatric 
Association filed an amicus brief strongly urging the U.S. Supreme Court to reject 
psychiatric testimony of future dangerousness prognoses; future dangerousness 
determinations are wrong in at least two out of every three predictions.66 
57.     349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
58.     See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (adopting the Lessard overt 
act standard); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. 
Supp. 509, 514−15 (D. Neb. 1975); In re Fasi, 567 A.2d 178, 183 (N.H. 1989). 
59.     See, e.g., Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 434 (D. Utah 1979); 
United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978); In re Snowden, 
423 A.2d 188, 191−92 & nn.3−4 (D.C. 1980); see also Michael J. Leiber & Sean Anderson, 
A Comparison of Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Civil Commitment Decisionmaking in Dane 
County, Wisconsin, 20 neW eng. J. on crIm. & cIV. confInement 1, 3 (1993).
60.     Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
61.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 41 & 58 n.24 (citing Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 
(D.C. Cir. 1960)).
62.     Id. at 41 & 58 n.27 (citing Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
63.     See id. at 41. 
64.     “[P]sychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.” 
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (emphasis added).
65.     See Ernst A. Wenk, James O. Robison & Gerald W. Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 
18 crIme & deLInQ. 393, 394 (1972); Leslie T. Wilkins, The Case for Prediction, in 3 crIme 
And JuStIce: the crImInAL In confInement 375 (Leon Radzinowicz & Marvin E. Wolfgang 
eds., 3d ed. 1971). 
66.     Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 3, Barefoot v. Estelle, 
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
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II. IncorporAtIon of SAnISm
  “Sanism” has also been defined as the belief that all persons with perceived 
or actual mental illnesses or disabilities possess characteristics or abilities specific 
to that category of illness, as to distinguish that condition as inferior to other 
mental states.67 Sanism is both unique to mental disability law and analogous to 
other “isms,” such as racism and sexism, which are fueled by stereotypes, myths, 
and generalizations.68 Since the American Psychiatric Association recognized 
substance-related and addictive disorders as mental disorders,69 such conditions are 
also subject to the same irrational prejudices that manifest as sanism. Sanism is 
especially problematic because it is often socially acceptable in ways other “isms” 
may not be, and is a prejudice held by those who ordinarily would reject similar 
biases in other contexts.70 
There is a long history of the prejudicial effects of sanism on involuntary 
civil commitments.71 In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the practice of forced 
sterilization for women deemed mentally retarded because such persons were 
“menace[s]” who “sap the strength of the state,” and it was necessary to “prevent 
our being swamped with incompetence.”72 Today, a lack of set criteria for medical 
evaluations and clear legal definitions provides the opportunity for the roots of sanism 
to infiltrate medical and legal discretionary decision making. As Michael Perlin notes:
The entire legal system makes assumptions about persons with 
mental disabilities—who they are, how they got that way, what 
makes them different, what there is about them that lets us treat 
them differently, and whether their conditions are immutable. These 
assumptions reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental 
disability, persons with mental disability, and the possibility that we 
ourselves may become mentally disabled.73 
 Assumptions and biases have an even greater tendency to infiltrate civil 
commitment proceedings due to the nature of many of the procedural issues. Many 
67.     See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking at Non-Institution-
al Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 n.y.L. Sch. L. reV. 535, 536 (2003).
68.     Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 cLInIcAL L. reV. 683, 683 (2003).
69.     Am. pSychIAtrIc ASS’n, SubStAnce-reLAted & AddIctIVe dISorderS (2013). The term 
“substance dependent” was first included in the third edition of the APA’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1987. Henry R. Kranzler & Ting-Kai Li, What is 
Addiction?, 31 ALcohoL reS. & heALth 93, 93 (2008).
70.     Perlin, supra note 68, at 686.
71.     See generally id.; Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 Smu L. reV. 373 (1992).
72.     Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206, 207 (1927).
73.     Perlin, supra note 68, at 688.
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of these procedural issues, unlike those of criminal cases, are rarely litigated.74 As a 
result, most hearings become a matter of first impression,75 thereby granting judges 
greater discretion. In cases regarding the right to refuse medical care, some judges 
have been found to simply “rubber stamp” hospital treatment recommendations 
without further investigation.76 
While sanism itself presents concerns, additional biases can lead to further 
diminishment of the protections of traditional civil commitment procedures, thereby 
rendering established safeguards inadequate. Additional statuses—such as pregnant 
drug user, minority background, and/or low socioeconomic class—carry an even 
greater likelihood of inaccurate determinations of dangerousness.77 When a woman 
deviates from society’s expectations, she can be seen as dangerous, irrespective of 
any threat of harm posed to herself or to others. And, as Alexander Brooks explains, 
“[s]ince very few mentally ill persons are presented for commitment unless their 
behavior is perceived as somewhat deviant, the extent to which deviance is equated 
with dangerousness tends to render the dangerousness standard meaningless.”78 
 
A. Crossroads: Where Pregnancy, Substance Use, Socioeconomic Status, 
and Race Intersect
  
Constitutional limits require that civil commitments be justified by at 
least clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and a danger to oneself or 
others.79 There are currently four states with statutes that explicitly authorize civil 
commitment of pregnant women when drug or alcohol use poses a risk to the fetus.80 
In response to a state supreme court decision,81 Wisconsin amended its state child 
abuse law to include “unborn child” in order to subject a pregnant woman to civil 
commitment when a habitual lack of self-control with drugs or alcohol poses a risk 
to her unborn child’s health.82 Similar to Wisconsin’s approach, Oklahoma created a 
separate section in its public health code, entitled the “Oklahoma Prenatal Addiction 
Act,” permitting a district attorney to seek an “appropriate disposition,” including 
74.     Id. at 704−05.
75.     Id. at 704.
76.     Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretexuality, and 
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. contemp. LegAL ISSueS 3, 16 
(1999).
77.     While this Note does not ignore the role of immigration status, language barriers, age, 
and LGBTQ status amongst other biases, discussion will be limited to biases surrounding 
gender, pregnancy, socioeconomic status, and race.
78.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 42–43.
79.     See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Paltrow, supra note 19, at 469.
80.     See supra notes 12–15.
81.     State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (holding the Wis-
consin state legislature did not intend for term “child” in child abuse law to include fetus).
82.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.133, .193 (West 2011).
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involuntary commitment, for “a pregnant woman who is abusing or is addicted to 
drugs or alcohol to the extent that the unborn child is at risk of harm.”83 Minnesota 
took an alternative approach and included pregnant women who use drugs under its 
preexisting statutory definition of “chemically dependent person[s]” subject to civil 
commitment.84 Similarly, South Dakota added the status of “pregnant and abusing 
alcohol or drugs” to its general civil commitment statute.85
 Whether detention of pregnant women is pursued through general civil 
commitment statutes86 or amended child protection statutes,87 problems arise. April 
Cherry, a lawyer and legal scholar, stated:
    
Any determination that a woman had violated the [civil commitment] 
statute would necessarily be speculative since scientific research in 
this area is inconclusive; not all pregnant mothers who drink alcohol 
or consume illicit drugs will bear children with injuries. Nor are 
those who are injured by their mother’s prenatal alcohol or drug 
use injured in the same manner or to the same extent. As a result, 
any commitment made pursuant to the statute is based not on the 
ordinary standard of clear and convincing evidence of harm, but 
rather on inconclusive scientific research and often-speculative 
beliefs regarding harm to the fetus.88 
When inconclusive scientific evidence is paired with “a potentially perilous degree 
of discretion”89 a prime opportunity is created for personal biases to infiltrate any 
determination of dangerousness.i.   Pregnancy and Substance Use
 From the perspective of radical feminists, societal views of motherhood, 
including pregnancy, are shaped by patriarchal norms.90 In other words, the social 
83.     okLA. StAt. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-546.5 (West 2000).
84.     mInn. StAt. Ann. § 253B.02(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2015).
85.     S.D. codIfIed LAWS § 34-20A-63 (2011).
86.     See, e.g., mInn. StAt. Ann. § 253B (West 2007 & Supp. 2015). 
87.     For specific reference to pregnant women in child welfare statutes see, for example, 
WIS. StAt. Ann. §§ 48.01–02, 48.133–135, 48.193, 48.203–207, 48.213, 48.235, 48.305, 
48.345, 48.347 (West 2014); cf. State v. Ayala, 991 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (inter-
preting civil commitment statute to allow for commitment of pregnant women for protection 
of their fetuses).
88.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 165 (emphasis added).
89.     Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin’s Revised 
Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. med. & ethIcS 332, 337 (1999).
90.     April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Ges-
tational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 tex. J. Women & L. 83, 91 (2001).
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institution of motherhood is “usually understood as the work that women are 
culturally required to perform as childrearers.”91 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
pregnant women encounter biases on the sole basis of being pregnant. Although 
pregnancy can be a visible reminder to society of femininity and sexuality, pregnant 
women are often perceived as “childlike.”92 Research showing societal discomfort 
and disdain for pregnant women who are featured provocatively in the media 
arguably demonstrates that nontraditional actions of pregnant women, such as 
display of sexual appeal, is too “dangerous.”93  
 Research in the field of psychology yields additional implications. Young 
adults have been found to “perceive pregnant women as irritable, emotional, and 
suffering from physical maladies.”94 Other studies have shown that people hold 
negative perceptions of and attitudes towards women who are pregnant in the 
workplace.95 Yet additional psychological research finds that individuals are more 
likely to provide assistance to a pregnant woman going about her daily activities 
than to a nonpregnant woman in a similar situation.96 Therefore, the view of 
pregnant women as both needing and deserving help due to their pregnant status 
can simultaneously result in resentment and criticism for perceived dependence.97 
 These biases regarding pregnant women are intensified by the presence 
of other factors, including substance use. A retired Wisconsin state representative 
who helped write the state’s child welfare statute argued that civil commitment 
of pregnant women was necessary because “[i]f the mother isn’t smart enough 
not to do drugs, we’ve got to step in.”98 Perceptions of drug users as lacking self-
control and responsibility are intensified during pregnancy, since the woman is not 
just seen as acting upon herself, but also upon her future child. As April Cherry 
notes, a pregnant woman who uses drugs falls outside of society’s belief that good 
mothers should be self-sacrificing, and is instead viewed as “self-indulgent, placing 
her desire to get ‘high’ ahead of the need of her offspring to be born healthy.”99 This 
preconceived notion of the personal qualities of pregnant drug users is reflected in 
statutory language allowing for commitment when an expectant mother “habitually 
lacks self-control.”100 
91.     Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
92.     Marci Lobel, Pregnancy and Mental Health, in 3 encycLopedIA of mentAL heALth 229, 
232 (Howard Friedman ed., 1998).
93.     Id.
94.     cLAIre A. etAugh & JudIth S. brIdgeS, Women’S LIVeS: A topIcAL ApproAch 206 
(2006) (citing research by Hilary Lips). 
95.     Id.
96.     Lobel, supra note 92, at 232.
97.     Id. 
98.     Eckholm, supra note 2 (emphasis added) (quoting Bonnie Ladwig).
99.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 153 (quoting JeAn reIth SchroedeL, IS the fetuS A reAL per-
Son? A compArISon of poLIcIeS AcroSS the fIfty StAteS 103 (2002)).
100.    See, e.g., WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2011).
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 Societal perceptions of pregnant women—with the additional layers of 
race, socioeconomic status, and addiction—affect how providers and decision 
makers respond to women more than knowledge of women’s rights and the 
laws that may be used to control perinatal behavior.101 Decision makers may 
have already formed an internal value determination as to whether addiction is 
a result of physiological causes or free will. Should a decision maker hold a 
preconceived belief that addiction is based solely on free will, and thus based on 
moral culpability, he or she may be more likely to find a drug addict dangerous, 
rather than forming an individualized determination.
 Given the medical uncertainty of predicting outcomes in individual cases 
of fetal exposure to drugs and alcohol, any medical evidence presented to meet 
the “clear and convincing” standard is likely insufficient.102 Therefore, court-
ordered civil commitments have a greater likelihood of being based on myths of 
drug use and whether the pregnant woman is conforming to societal standards, 
rather than an individualized determination of actual dangerousness. 
 ii.   Pregnancy, Low Socioeconomic Status, and Substance Use
  
 Public perceptions of pregnant women also fluctuate depending on 
the pregnant woman’s socioeconomic status. Studies comparing the strategic 
placement of clothing in department stores revealed that higher-status stores were 
more likely to place maternity clothing near lingerie sections than lower-status 
stores.103 In contrast, lower-status stores were more likely to place maternity 
clothing near uniforms or plus-size clothing.104 Since profit-driven department 
stores arrange their products according to consumer preferences, it can be 
inferred that product placement studies reflect societal views of pregnant women 
that differ based on the woman’s socioeconomic class.105
 The lower a woman’s socioeconomic class, the more likely she will be 
viewed negatively when she becomes pregnant and is suspected of drug use. 
Federal statutes already target low-income persons with a history of alcohol 
and drug use, thereby reinforcing the stigma of addiction. For instance, the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF)106 creates a default 
rule prohibiting receipt of benefits through TANF and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) if the applicant has a prior felony drug conviction.107 
Conditioning receipt of needed benefits on previous substance use reflects the 
101.     Garcia, supra note 25, at 133.
102.     De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 336.
103.     Lobel, supra note 92, at 232.
104.     Id.
105.     Id.
106.     42 U.S.C. §§ 601−619 (2012) (creating block grants for states to provide assistance 
for families in need).
107.     21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012). 
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societal view that addiction is a matter of free will and representative of a poor 
work ethic.108
Once pregnancy status is taken into consideration, the view of the “welfare 
crack mother” is exaserbated.109 Review of the political climate during the 1980s 
shows the popular characterization of all mothers receiving government benefits as 
“unfit mothers selling their children’s food stamps to buy their next crack rock.”110 
This generalized public image is reflective of conservative legislators’ underlying 
motivations to reduce government spending for all pregnant women of low 
socioeconomic status, regardless of whether or not drug use is present.111 
 The desire to eliminate government spending for pregnant women of low 
socioeconomic status could easily translate into the perception that government 
intervention is necessary to avoid future costs. In light of prior extensive press 
coverage predicting the enormous costs of care for drug-addicted newborns and the 
burdens that would fall on society from their disabilities,112 a decision maker may 
be motivated to avoid such future societal costs rather than prevent an immediate, 
actual danger.113 This trigger-happy approach may become more likely when the 
decision maker believes the pregnant woman’s low socioeconomic status will 
108.     As of February 19, 2015, “[a]t least twelve states have passed legislation regarding 
drug testing or screening for public assistance applicants or recipients.” Drug Testing for 
Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, nAt’L conf. St. LegISLAtureS (Feb. 19, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx. 
Conservative lawmakers have also proposed that states drug test unemployment applicants. 
Alex M. Parker, GOP: Drug Tests for Unemployment Applicants, u.S. neWS & WorLd rep. 
(Dec. 9, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/12/09/gop-drug-tests-
for-unemployment-applicants. 
109.     SheIgLA murphy & mArShA roSenbAum, pregnAnt Women on drugS: combAtIng 
StereotypeS And StIgmA 140 (1999) (“The image of poor inner-city African Americans, 
whose mothering instincts had been destroyed by crack, was highly publicized and widely 
accepted.”).
110.     Id. at 142.
111.     Id.
112.     See, e.g., Karen Dukess, Children Born to Drug Users Need New Kind of Teaching, 
St. peterSburg tImeS, Sept. 11, 1989, at 1A; Karen Dukess & Karl Vick, Cocaine’s Most In-
nocent Victims, St. peterSburg tImeS, Sept. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 1; The Crack Children, neWS-
Week, Feb. 12, 1990, at 62; Study of Addicted Babies Hints Vast Cost, n.y. tImeS (Mar. 17, 
1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/17/us/study-of-addicted-babies-hints-vast-cost.html. 
Based on 1990 figures, neonatal cost of health care for infants exposed to cocaine in utero 
was estimated to reach an average of $5200 more than costs for an unexposed infant. Dur-
ing the 1990s, special education was predicted to be needed by all drug-exposed children at 
an estimated cost of 2.6 times the amount of regular schooling. Page McGuire Linden, Drug 
Addiction During Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 Am. u. J. gender 
Soc. poL’y & L. 105, 109 (1995).
113.     Garcia, supra note 25, at 137 (“[O]nce individuals have come to terms with their 
views on the social/community aspects of responsibility, they are also likely to take a position 
on legal responsibility and accountability within both the criminal and civil law contexts.”).
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prevent her from paying for care once the child is born. iii.   Pregnancy, Race and Substance Use
 
 The historical devaluation of black women as mothers results in biases 
surrounding black women during their pregnancies.114 Dorothy Roberts examines 
the social phenomena of devaluing black women as mothers, from reproductive 
oppression of black women during slavery to coerced sterilization and the 
unwarranted removal of black children from family households.115 
 The history of slavery and reproductive oppression of black women produced 
long-lasting notions that black women are sexually promiscuous and outside of the 
traditional ideology of femininity and motherhood.116 These longstanding prejudices 
continue to establish white middle-class motherhood as the norm, supporting the 
belief that black mothers are incapable of caring for their children.117 Not only do 
black families tend to diverge from the traditional white nuclear family structure, 
but black families are also more likely to be welfare recipients, which results in 
government supervision through the welfare system and a greater likelihood of 
neglect reports.118 Perceived neglect by black families who receive such government 
assistance is more likely to be reported to government agencies than alleged neglect 
by white, affluent families who are not subject to such government supervision.119 
 Resulting popular notions denigrate black mothers as incompetent and 
lazy, only “breed[ing] children at the expense of taxpayers in order to increase the 
amount of her welfare check.”120 When the patient is a woman of color or from a 
lower socioeconomic class, medical professionals are more likely to perceive the 
woman as incompetent and weigh the interests of the fetus as superior.121 In these 
instances, doctors are more likely to seek court-ordered obstetrical intervention, 
114.     See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women 
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 hArV. L. reV. 1419, 1436−44 (1991).
115.     Id.
116.     Id. at 1437−40.
117.     Id. at 1441. The belief that black mothers are incapable traces back to the days of slav-
ery, as evidenced by the census record in which a black child’s death from sudden infant death 
syndrome was attributed to the entire “negro population” as “clearly . . . prov[ing] their great 
carelessness & total inability to take care of themselves.” Michael P. Johnson, Smothered 
Slave Infants: Were Slave Mothers at Fault?, 47 J.S. hISt. 493, 495 (1981); see also Todd L. 
Savitt, Smothering and Overlaying of Virginia Slave Children: A Suggested Explanation, 49 
buLL. hISt. med. 400, 400 (1975).
118.     Roberts, supra note 114, at 1440−41.
119.     Id.
120.     Id. at 1444.
121.     Cheryl E. Amana, Drugs, AIDS and Reproductive Choice: Maternal-State Conflict 
Continues into the Millennium, 28 n.c. cent. L.J. 32, 34 (2005).
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which courts overwhelmingly grant.122 Similarly, the perception that black 
mothers are incompetent to make childrearing decisions overflows to all areas of 
reproductive decisions. For instance, in 2011, a billboard of a young black girl in 
a pretty pink dress was erected in a largely white community in New York City 
with the message: “The most dangerous place for an African American is in the 
womb.”123 Such public messages convey the idea that black women are not to be 
trusted during pregnancy or motherhood, and provide an improper rationalization 
for a decision maker’s belief that government intervention during pregnancy is 
necessary before a black woman even steps foot in a civil commitment proceeding.
 Individual biases and assumptions about race in the context of pregnancy 
are exacerbated by targeted drug policies with a history of racial discrimination. 
The first commission to assess drug use in the United States was established in 
1908, arguably setting precedent for inflating statistics to promote racism under 
the guise of drug policy.124 Heading the first commission, Dr. Wright associated 
opium addiction with the Chinese and reported to Congress that “[c]ocaine is often 
the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the Negroes.”125 It is not surprising, 
then, that media coverage, beginning in the 1980s, reported the “War on Drugs” 
in great depth with alarming language.126 The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was the 
start of a crack cocaine sentencing disparity that continued for over two decades.127 
“[P]ossession of crack—a drug predominantly found in communities of color—
was punished up to 100 times more harshly than powder cocaine, which is more 
expensive and use of which is concentrated in white communities.”128
 Interestingly, black communities located in inner cities have the highest 
concentration of crack cocaine users.129 Traditional primary focus on “crack 
babies” has resulted in disproportionate, highly publicized prosecutions of black 
women alleged to use crack cocaine during pregnancy.130 Yet, studies now show 
that the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the anticipated 
medical consequences for children exposed to cocaine in utero that had motivated 
122.     Id. (“[W]hen court-ordered obstetrical intervention was sought, 81% of the women 
involved were [women of color]. . . . Intervention was ordered in 86% of the cases . . . .”).
123.     Liz Robbins, Billboard Opposing Abortion Stirs Debate, n.y. tImeS (Feb. 23, 2011, 
12:08 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/billboard-opposing-abortion-stirs-
debate/. Although the billboard’s creators had anti-abortion motivations, such messages dem-
onstrate a greater distrust of black women in health care decision making during all stages of 
pregnancy.  
124.     See mIke grAy, drug crAzy: hoW We got Into thIS meSS And hoW We cAn get 
out 41–43 (1998).
125.     Id. at 46–47.
126.     Paltrow, supra note 19, at 461 (quoting news reports describing crack as “a plague that 
was eating away at the fabric of America” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
127.     Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 385−86.
128.     Id. at 385.
129.     Roberts, supra note 114, at 1435.
130.     Id.
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government intervention.131 Rather, researchers attribute poor fetal outcomes to 
poverty and “challenging environments” common to those receiving government-
funded medical assistance.132 
 Additional studies help to further explain the over-policing of minority 
women who use drugs during pregnancy, and the under-policing of white women 
who use drugs during pregnancy. Despite similar rates of overall substance abuse, 
medical professionals are more likely to report drug use of minority women during 
pregnancy than drug use of white women during pregnancy.133 A study showed 
that amongst pregnant drug users, black women used cocaine more frequently, 
while white women used marijuana more frequently.134 Yet, fetal rights supporters 
continue to focus almost exclusively on crack cocaine despite the fact that rates of 
alcohol and tobacco use amongst pregnant women are far greater, and while “the 
effects of cocaine use may have been overstated in the past,” the harmful effects 
of alcohol and tobacco use during pregnancy are better documented.135 Placing 
emphasis on substances that are more likely to be used by minority women strongly 
suggests that stereotypes and biases are at play.136
 The likelihood of reporting is also greatly affected by what type of provider a 
woman receives her prenatal care from. Black women are more likely to be reported 
to government agencies for drug use.137 Poor women—who are disproportionately 
black in the United States—are more likely to receive services from government 
agencies, and, therefore, are subjected to greater government monitoring.138 Due to 
discriminatory testing procedures and racial biases held by medical professionals, 
government agencies providing prenatal services exert greater efforts to detect and 
report substance use by black women.139 On the other hand, affluent women—
who are disproportionately white—are more likely to receive services from 
private medical facilities that are less motivated to screen for drugs because of the 
131.     Decades Later, Drugs Didn’t Hold ‘Crack Babies’ Back, NPR (July 31, 2013, 12:00 
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=207292639.  
132.     Id.
133.     See, e.g., Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of 
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting 
in Pinellas County, Florida, 332 neW eng. J. med. 1202 (1990) (describing a study show-
ing controlled substance abuse during pregnancy is ten times more likely to be reported to 
authorities for black women, despite white women having slightly higher rates of drug usage 
at first prenatal visit). 
134.     Id. at 1204.
135.     cynthIA dAILArd & eLIzAbeth nASh, StAte reSponSeS to SubStAnce AbuSe Among 
pregnAnt Women 6 (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/6/gr030603.pdf.
136.     “Although the type of drug may differ, individuals from all races and socioeconomic 
strata have similar rates of substance abuse and addiction.” Acog no. 473, supra note 30, at 1.
137.     Roberts, supra note 114, at 1422, 1432.
138.     Id.
139.     Id. at 1422, 1432−34.
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financial incentive to retain business and receive referrals.140 In private medical 
facility settings, medical professionals are more socially similar to their patients, 
and, therefore, their biases surrounding pregnant drug users are less likely to be 
implicated.141 Studies have demonstrated that doctors are inclined to communicate 
with private white patients when there is a disagreement regarding treatment, but 
are more likely to seek court assistance when there is treatment disagreement with 
patients of color, of low socioeconomic class, with language barriers, or some 
combination thereof.142 
 Medical professionals and government agency workers often hold strong 
biases that result in higher rates of reporting from their interactions with black 
and low-income pregnant women.143 As a result, the majority of women facing 
criminal or civil proceedings are minorities and low-income.144 Such realities exist 
even when taking into account that alcohol and drug use occurs across racial and 
socioeconomic lines.145 These startling statistics perpetuate biases originating from 
stereotypes and skewed media reports,146 biases already held by decision makers 
in the civil commitment context. When the majority of women before a judge 
or jury are minority, low-income women,147 the decision maker’s preconceived 
biases are reaffirmed. Additionally, when the substance alleged is crack cocaine, 
a decision maker may believe there is a greater presence of danger based on his or 
her exposure to prior widespread coverage of predicted effects of crack cocaine on 
fetal development.148
 The reaffirmation of previously held biases founded and supported by 
the news (for example, “black women have crack babies”) will then influence 
140.     Id. at 1433.
141.     Id. 
142.     See, e.g., Amana, supra note 121, at 34 (citing Veronika E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher 
& Michael T. Parsons, Court Ordered Obstetrical Intervention, 316 neW eng. J. med. 1192, 
1193−94 (1987)).
143.     See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, The Policy and Politics of Reproduc-
tive Health: Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 
1973−2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. heALth poL. 
poL’y & L. 299, 326−27 (2013).
144.     Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 143, at 310 (summariz-
ing study results showing that of those prosecuted, fifty-two percent were black and seventy-
one percent had low socioeconomic status (as represented by indigent defense)).
145.     Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249.
146.     See, e.g., Drew Humphries, Crack Mothers at 6: Prime-Time News, Crack/Cocaine, 
and Women, 4 VIoLence AgAInSt Women 45 (1998) (performing a qualitative analysis of the 
news’ presentation of black women and determining that black women are portrayed differ-
ently and more negatively than white women).
147.     See Chavkin, supra note 47, at 249.
148.     See dorothy robertS, kILLIng the bLAck body: rAce, reproductIon, And the meAn-
Ing of LIberty 154−59 (1997) (discussing the great extent of news coverage of maternal drug 
abuse).
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the decision maker’s determination of dangerousness, rather than an individual 
determination of the facts presented. In turn, minority and low-income women will 
continue to be civilly committed and, as a result, continue to be the subjects of 
news reports. Through this perilous cycle, overrepresentation of women of color 
in criminal and civil proceedings continues to both create and reaffirm biases that 
influence decision making. 
B. The Multiplication Effect upon the Civil Commitment Standard 
  
 Biases infiltrating decision making multiply in the civil commitment 
context when there are alleged threats to fetuses. Thus, traditional purposes and 
safeguards of civil commitment are diminished when civil commitment is used to 
police pregnant women. Prenatal and maternity care are already generalized, with 
variations among categories of providers and geographic  regions, rather than based 
on the individual needs of each mother and her newborn.149 A Milbank Report finds 
that evidence-based care is often disregarded in favor of disapproved and intrusive 
health care practices for childbearing women.150 
 With a medical field that commonly utilizes a generalized care regimen 
and holds particularized expectations of pregnant women, it is likely that medical 
professionals and decision makers will exercise a strong bias towards a statistician’s 
“type 2 error.”151 In other words, a medical professional or decision maker will 
be more likely to classify a non-dangerous person as dangerous (false positive, 
type 2) than to classify a dangerous person as non-dangerous (false negative, type 
1).152 Decision makers are motivated to favor type 2 errors because there is greater 
potential for harm and repercussions to the decision maker when misdiagnosing 
dangerousness as opposed to misdiagnosing non-dangerousness.153 This tendency 
is especially problematic when the decision maker already incorporates biases into 
his or her exercise of broad discretion. 
 For example, South Dakota’s emergency commitment statute allows for a 
woman who is pregnant and abusing drugs to be detained, yet fails to provide a 
clear standard as to what constitutes “abusing alcohol or drugs.”154 Likewise, when 
149.     See, e.g., SAkALA & corry, supra note 18, at 1. 
150.     Id. at 4 (“Although most childbearing women and newborns in the United States are 
healthy and at low risk for complications, national surveys reveal that essentially all women 
who give birth in U.S. hospitals experience high rates of interventions with risks of adverse 
effects.”).
151.     D.L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SAntA cLArA LAW. 379, 385 
(1973).
152.     Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 49, at 44.
153.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 44 (describing self-protectiveness as motivation for psychia-
trists to refrain from providing “false negative” testimony).
154.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 168−69; Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493−94 (citing S.D. 
codIfIed LAWS § 34-20A-63(3) (1998)).
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the Wisconsin legislature amended its child welfare statute to explicitly include 
“expectant mothers,” it declined to include a single interpretive guideline.155 When 
decision makers cannot turn to the text of the relevant law or state procedure 
manuals for clarification, the opportunity exists for personal determinations of 
dispositive issues such as what level of use qualifies as “abusing.”156 Such broad 
discretion allows judges and juries, who are already prone to false positives, to 
rely on improper biases and misperceptions, especially when great uncertainty 
lies in determining harm from exposure to drugs or alcohol in utero.157 
 The difficulty in using only medical evidence to predict dangerousness 
lies in the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude and probability of harm to a 
fetus.158 Damage to fetuses dramatically varies from case to case, from instances 
of no damage to instances of devastating damage.159 Yet, the public and media’s 
assumption that “[a]ll drug-exposed children are seriously damaged at birth” 
is reflected in legislative intent and statutory language.160 Contrary to public 
perception, Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant 
Women, explains:
It is certainly true that some newborns exposed prenatally to 
some drugs do suffer adverse short- or long-term consequences—
as do infants whose mothers lacked access to quality prenatal 
care and adequate nutrition, smoked or drank while pregnant, or 
used fertility-enhancing medications that cause multiple births 
associated with prematurity and other life-threatening hazards. 
But as experts in the field have noted, “the public outcry for the 
punishment of substance-using mothers and the disenfranchisement 
of their children as [an] unsalvageable almost demonic ‘biologic 
underclass’ rests not on scientific findings but upon media hysteria 
fueled by selected anecdotes.”161 
155.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 166.
156.     Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493−94.
157.     See, e.g., De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 332 (“Even though substance abuse 
poses a risk of harm to the child who will be born, its magnitude and probability is highly 
uncertain.”). 
158.     Id.; see also Caroline S. Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal 
Alcohol Abuse and the Viability of an Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Punitive 
and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 hAStIngS Women’S L.J. 
287, 298 (1999).
159.     De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 332. 
160.     Paltrow, supra note 19, at 474−75.
161.     Id. at 475 (emphasis added) (quoting Deborah A. Frank et al., Maternal Cocaine Use: 
Impact on Child Health & Development, 40 AdVAnceS In pedIAtrIcS 65 (1993)).
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 Such media hysteria162 can serve as a primary source of knowledge about 
particular scientific issues for many people, including medical professionals.163 
As a result, despite numerous well-founded studies concluding that the predicted 
“crack baby” epidemic was grossly exaggerated and that other factors are likely the 
contributing causes of prenatal harm,164 decision makers may still continue to base 
determinations of dangerousness on prior unsubstantiated media reports. Holding 
on to one’s primary source of knowledge can result from a lack of awareness of 
subsequent studies,165 or tendencies of the human psyche. The belief perseverance 
paradigm, developed in psychology studies, demonstrates that people maintain 
incorrect beliefs even after subsequently learning that their beliefs are based on 
false information.166 Studies have not only shown that correcting widely held 
misinformed beliefs result in little effect on peoples’ attitudes;167 they have shown 
that a backfire effect can occur, as well. People can actually become more adamant 
after receiving information that is contrary to their beliefs.168 Furthermore, if the 
decision maker already holds ideological beliefs that reflect general biases against 
women, minorities, and those of low socioeconomic status, he or she is more likely 
to adhere to such misperceptions, rather than change his or her beliefs to attune to 
correct information.169
 Dr. Hallam Hurt, the lead investigator in the “A Thousand Babies” study, 
agreed in an interview that previous media reports “created an aura of suspicion 
around pregnant women of a certain background that was not deserved.”170 He 
attributed this aura of suspicion to previous faulty beliefs of in utero cocaine 
162.     “Between 1985 and 2000, major U.S. newspapers featured 197 stories about pregnant 
women and cocaine addiction . . . .” Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 390.
163.     emmA cunLIffe, murder, medIcIne And motherhood 157 (2011).
164.     Paltrow, supra note 19, at 461−62.
165.     Emma Cunliffe explains lack of awareness:
Court records and medical research are neither readily accessible to nor com-
monly accessed by the public. While judgments are now widely available 
through free online services, it is relatively rare for a person to find and read 
a judgment unless he or she has a personal or professional interest in the case.
 cunLIffe, supra note 163, at 157.
166.     Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, The Perseverance of Beliefs: Empirical and Normative 
Considerations, in 4 fALLIbLe Judgment In behAVIorAL reSeArch: neW dIrectIonS for meth-
odology of Social and Behavioral Science 17, 17−36 (Richard A. Shweder ed., 1980).
167.     See, e.g., John Sides & Jack Citrin, How Large the Huddled Masses? The Causes and 
Consequences of Public Misperceptions About Immigrant Populations (2007) (paper pre-
sented at 2007 annual meeting of Midwest Political Science Association), http://home.gwu.
edu/~jsides/huddled.pdf.
168.     Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political 
Misperceptions, 32 poL. behAV. 303, 323 (2010).
169.     See id. at 323 (“[D]irect factual contradictions can actually strengthen ideologically 
grounded factual beliefs . . . .”).
170.     Decades Later, Drugs Didn’t Hold ‘Crack Babies’ Back, supra note 131.
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exposure, and to the discrepancies in testing of middle- and upper-middle-class 
drug users.171 Furthermore, he stated that in retrospect, “[i]t was really, I think, 
relatively easy to be more condemning regarding the moms who used drugs.”172 
 In the criminal justice context, a nationwide study endorses the theory 
that judges often base sentences on perceptions of appropriate gender roles, and 
whether the convicted crime supports or contradicts such roles.173 For instance, 
women receive more lenient sentences than their male counterparts for many 
crimes.174 However, when gender roles are violated—for instance, in convictions 
for child abandonment—judges give women harsher sentences than their male 
counterparts.175 It is logical to suspect that in the civil commitment context where 
discretionary power is as great as—if not greater than—criminal sentencing, 
judges are just as likely to base determinations of dangerousness on perceptions 
of conformity to or violation of gender roles.
 Use of emotionally charged language in statutes policing pregnant 
women invokes gender roles and affects how a statute is interpreted during a 
court proceeding.176 For instance, De Ville and Kopelman argue that the use of 
statutory language such as “expectant mother” (rather than “pregnant woman”) in 
describing a person to be reviewed for commitment “highlights their social role 
and presumptive duties to their fetuses and society, that is, their status as expectant 
mothers.”177 They argue that “such an approach might be expected to focus on 
maternal duty and devalue individual rights.”178 As a result, when a court reviews 
a pregnant woman’s case under a dangerousness standard, it inevitably focuses 
on maternal duty, which can unnecessarily stigmatize a woman as threatening and 
unmotherly, rather than simply in need of treatment.179
 When legislatures elect to use terms such as “unborn child” rather than 
“fetus,” the language shifts “the legal calculus from one that balances a woman’s 
rights against state interests, to one that balances a woman’s rights against a 
171.     Id.  
172.     Id. (emphasis added); see also Brooks, supra note 49, at 44 (arguing that experts 
might formulate medical opinions on perceived societal expectations).
173.     Becker, supra note 19, at 238 (discussing Matthew Zingraff & Randall Thomson, Dif-
ferential Sentencing of Women and Men in the U.S.A., 12 Int’L J. Soc. L. 401, 410 (1984)).
174.     Id.
175.     Id.
176.     De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 334 (“A statute’s language, the legislators’ 
choice of terms, can reflect the underlying ideology that inspired the law and have a practical 
impact on how the policy is implemented.”).
177.     Id.
178.     Id.
179.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 39.
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child’s rights.”180 This shift, in particular, removes pregnant persons from the 
traditional civil commitment analysis, and increases the likelihood that biases outside 
of traditional dangerousness analyses will improperly influence judges and jurors.181
 Although the American Medical Association has found “that addiction is 
not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower,”182 statutes that form the 
basis for civil commitment with terminology such as “habitually lacks self-control”183 
reinforce the notion that addiction is due to individual culpability. The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists—arguably in the best position to develop 
prenatal care policy—recognizes that involuntary civil commitment approaches 
“treat addiction as a moral failing.”184
 Invoking one’s constitutional right to refuse medical treatment185 can lead to 
involuntary commitment.186 Similarly, in the pregnancy context, Wisconsin’s child 
welfare statute allows for commitment on the basis that an “adult expectant mother 
is refusing or has refused to accept any alcohol or drug abuse services offered to her 
or is not making or has not made a good faith effort to participate in any alcohol or 
other drug abuse services offered to her.”187 These statutes, in effect, force pregnant 
women to succumb to their physicians’ “personal values and preferences regarding 
treatment.”188 For example, a pregnant woman like Alicia could fall under the statute 
by refusing her physician’s “offer” for alcohol or drug abuse services, even when 
such services are not medically necessary, but are insisted upon merely because she 
had previously used drugs or alcohol. Additionally, an open definition of “good faith 
effort” invites decision makers to rely upon their beliefs of what mothers generally 
should be doing, rather than considering the individual woman’s attempts that would 
be sufficient in her specific circumstances.
180.     De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 334; see also Dawn Johnsen, Shared Inter-
ests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women’s Liberty, 43 hAStIngS L.J. 569 
(1992).
181.     Current academic scholarship explores in-depth the attempts of fetal right supporters 
to promote the legal myth that a mother and unborn child are separate legal persons. This be-
comes especially problematic in the civil commitment context where determinations of dan-
gerousness can improperly include an unborn child in the equation. See, e.g., Cherry, supra 
note 19, at 178−79; Lynn Paltrow, Punishment and Prejudice: Judging Drug Using Pregnant 
Women, in Mother trouBleS 73−78 (Julia Hanigsberg & Sara Ruddick eds., 1999).
182.     Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Medical Association in Support of Neither Party 
at 7, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936).
183.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.133 (West 2011).
184.     Acog no. 473, supra note 30, at 1.
185.     Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
186.     Several statutes incorporate refusal of medical treatment as grounds for involuntary 
commitment. See, e.g., Ark. code Ann. § 20-47-104 (2014); tex. heALth & SAfety code 
Ann. §§ 572.003, 572.005 (West 2010). As applied in case law see, for example, Wessel v. 
Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Ark. 1978), In re Melas, 371 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985); In re J.B., 705 P.2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1985). 
187.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.347 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
188.     Cherry, supra note 19, at 170.
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 Furthermore, this approach ignores other factors aside from ongoing drug 
use that may explain a failure to complete recommended treatment. Failure of 
recommended services by itself, as stated in the Minnesota statute,189 does not 
necessarily reflect dangerousness. Instead, failure of recommended treatment 
could be due to a host of factors wholly unrelated to whether or not there is current 
substance use or abuse. A pregnant woman could “fail” a recommended treatment 
not for a positive drug test, but for missed sessions. The few available treatment 
programs for pregnant women have been historically male-centered190 and unable 
to provide services necessary for many women.191 The barriers that result from the 
lack of childcare, accessibility to transportation, and affordable treatment options 
rebut the notion that “failure” to receive recommended treatment is equivalent to 
refusal of treatment because of ongoing use.192 
 Where state statutes afford or require a guardian ad litem to represent a 
fetus,193 the physical presence of a legal representative for the fetus can lead to 
greater weight allocated to fetal interests to the detriment of a woman’s rights. 
In Wisconsin, the guardian ad litem is required to meet with the expectant 
mother to “assess the appropriateness and safety of the environment of the . . . 
unborn child.”194 Not only does such statutory language reduce a woman to an 
“environment” for a fetus,195 but it also encourages the guardian ad litem to make 
a determination based on his or her opinion of the woman rather than based on 
medical evidence. 
 Decisions surrounding whether commitment criteria are met, hearing 
dates, and the location of the assigned treatment center can also have special 
implications for pregnant women. Since the dangerousness standard is arguably 
satisfied on the basis of the possible future harm to the fetus, the commitment 
process can be “intentionally prolonged so that her detention and release coincide 
with the duration of her gestational period,” despite state laws setting time 
limitations.196 This abuse of discretionary power ignores that the alleged threat 
of danger may cease well before the woman’s due date. When the duration of 
189.     mInn. StAt. Ann. § 626.5561(2) (West 2009).
190.     Linden, supra note 112, at 138.
191.     dAILArd & nASh, supra note 135, at 6. 
192.     Acog no. 473, supra note 30.
193.     See, e.g., WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.213, .235 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
194.     WIS. StAt. Ann. § 48.235(3)(b)(1) (West 2011).
195.     Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493.
196.     Garcia, supra note 25, at 178. This would not be the first time a judge inappropriately 
based the length of detention on the length of the woman’s pregnancy, instead of factors tradi-
tionally considered. Id. at 198 (describing a D.C. Superior Court case where a judge disre-
garded applicable guidelines in order to sentence a pregnant drug user with jail time in efforts 
to protect the fetus); Cherry, supra note 19, at 147−48 (citing Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Cleary, 
754 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 2001) (conditioning length of sentencing term to prevent a woman 
from accessing an abortion)).  
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involuntary civil commitment is based solely on a woman’s gestational period, it 
violates U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence: commitment must end once the danger 
ceases to exist.197 
concLuSIon
 The U.S. Supreme Court firmly stated, in O’Connor v. Donaldson, that 
“[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation 
of a person’s physical liberty.”198 Yet, in the context of civil commitment, women 
with alleged substance use are often committed due to intolerance and animosity, 
rather than demonstrated dangerousness shown by clear and convincing evidence. 
 Alicia’s case demonstrates these inherent problems and the substantial loss 
of liberty that can result from the multiplication effect of biases concerning pregnant 
women. First, one can argue that the physical appearance of Alicia shackled in the 
courtroom, with only her fetus receiving counsel, encourages the decision maker 
to interpret Wisconsin’s emotionally charged statutory language to render Alicia 
“an environment” for the fetus, rather than a person with constitutional rights.199 
Furthermore, a dangerousness determination based solely on the refusal of medical 
treatment ignores research that shows cost as the leading reason people (including 
Alicia) forgo mental health treatment.200 As seen in Alicia’s case, when dangerousness 
remains undefined and medical testimony is not required,201 unsubstantiated beliefs 
can result in a finding of dangerousness absent any expert testimony traditionally 
relied upon in civil commitment settings. A determination based solely on a 
medical professional’s referral, as in Alicia’s case, can be unreliable; some medical 
professionals rationalize exaggerating “dangerousness” if they firmly believe that 
an individual is too “sick” to know that he or she needs treatment.202 
 In effect, involuntary civil commitment of pregnant women suspected 
of substance use is both under- and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive in that 
it targets women who are vulnerable to biases—women of racial minorities and 
low socioeconomic status—and ignores other populations of women who may use 
substances during pregnancy. It is over-inclusive in that it results in a deprivation of 
liberty for women who do not satisfy the traditional dangerousness requirement, as 
197.     O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[E]ven if his involuntary confine-
ment was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer 
existed.”).
198.     Id. at 575.
199.     See Paltrow, supra note 19, at 493.
200.     SubStAnce AbuSe & mentAL heALth SerVS. AdmIn., u.S. dep’t of heALth & humAn 
SerVS., reASonS for not receIVIng treAtment Among AduLtS WIth SerIouS mentAL ILLneSS 
(2003), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k3/MHnoTX/MHnoTX.pdf. 
201.     De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 337.
202.     Brooks, supra note 49, at 44. 
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in Alicia’s case. Instead of finding clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness 
to self or others, civil commitment decisions continue to depend upon whether the 
pregnant woman supports or violates gender norms and whether she falls into a 
racial and socioeconomic category that supports the decision maker’s preconceived 
beliefs.203 As written, statutes policing pregnant women by forcible civil commitment 
cannot be applied in a manner that would avoid the problems arising from sanism, 
sexism, racism, and socioeconomic biases.
203.     “The legislation may allow decision-makers to base their judgments of ‘substantial’ 
and ‘risk,’ not on the complicated and sometimes unequivocal medical and science evidence 
regarding maternal substance abuse, but rather on their view of what constitutes appropriate 
behavior for an ‘expectant mother.’” De Ville & Kopelman, supra note 89, at 337.
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